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to establish any. fact material for the prosecution or to over-
come any material fact sought to be proved by the defense, it is 
admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense 
not included in the charge. 
[11] !d.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Where the murder charged 
was done with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver, which 
was never recovered, and there was evidence that at the time 
of commission of a prior offense defendants had been in 
the possession of three guns and that only two of these were 
known not to have been Smith and Wesson .38 Specials, a 
P38 automatic was admissible to corroborate testimony that 
defendants acquired such weapon at a time when they already 
had two guns, such evidence that defendants had a third gun 
of unknown make being relevant to show that they had the 
means to commit the crime. 
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions-
Evidence.-In a prosecution for murder, defendant could not 
successfully complain that the court should have immediately 
instructed the jury that a codefendant's references to his 
participation in previous robberies could not be used against 
him since the prosecution did not show that he had been 
present when codefendant was interrogated, where throughout 
the trial the eourt, when requested to do so, instructed clearly 
that statements made by one defendant were not evidence 
against another defendant who had not been present, and 
repeated this warning in its general instructions at the close 
of the trial, and where defendant did not request the court 
to repeat its warning at this particular juncture. 
[13] !d.-Appeal-Who May Urge Errors-Errors Affecting Co-
defendant.-Defendant may not complain that it was mis-
conduct for the prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that a 
codefendant had in fact made the statements attributed to him 
where the injury, if any, was to such codefendant whose 
appeal is not before the appellate court. 
[14] !d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof. 
-The party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative 
evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at 
the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis 
there has been no substitution or tampering. 
[15] !d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof. 
-The burden on the party offering demonstrative evidence is 
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all 
the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty 
with which the particular evidence could have been altered, 
it i;;: reasonably certain that there was no alteration, and the 
requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital 
link in the chain of possession is not accounted for. 
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!d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof. 
- \Vhen it is the barest speculation that there was 
with demonstrative evidence, it is proper to admit the evidenc(; 
and let what doubt remains go to its weight. 
Id.- Evidence- Demonstrative Evidence- Fingerprints.---
\Vhcre defendant did not point to any indication of adual 
tampering with fingc;rprints on a bottle and testii\ed to 
as being his, did not show how they could have been 
and did not establish that anyone who might have 
interested in tampering knew that the bottle and 
in a deputy sheriif's unlocked book case for a few it 
was not error to admit the bott.le and glass in evidnwe. 
[18] Homicide- Instructions- Degree of Offense.- It was not 
error to instruet the jury that, although there are two degrees 
of murder, the evidenee is such that either or both defendant:-; 
are innoeent of the eharge of murder or that one or both of 
them are guilty of first degree murder, where the evidence 
>vas overwhelming that the homicide was eommitted in the 
perpetration of a robbery. 
[19] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Where the evi-
denee was such that defendant was guilty, if at all, of murder 
in the perpetration of a robbery and the jury was instructed 
that such offense was first degree murder, other instructions 
on the code definition of murder, including provisions on pre-
meditated murder and second degree murder, and the eode 
definition of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 189, 211), were unneees-
sary, but if any confusion was generated by such instructions 
it eould only have benefited defendant by leading the jury 
to think that the question of degree of murder was still open 
to its determination. 
[20] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury may not weigh the 
possibility of pardon or parole in determining the guilt of 
accused in a murder case, but it may eonsider these conse-
quences in exercising its discretion to choose between different 
punishments. 
[21] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-It was not error for the 
court in a murder case to give the jury information about 
eligibility for parole before it had determined the question of 
guilt or innocencP, where the court cautioned the jury against 
allowing such information to influenee its determination of 
guilt. 
[22] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.--It was not error in n prosP-
cution for munle1· rommitted with n f\rpm·m to instnwt the 
jury that defendant eould he paro!Pd in ~PY<'ll ,\'<'111'~ if sentem·ed 
to Jifp imprisonment, sineP tlw proYision of Pen. Corle, ~ i10:2J, 
subd. (b), fixing the minimum sPntPnePs fnr prrsons aru1Pd with 
deadly weapons at 10 years, iil not concf•ru<>d with how mueh of 
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vVilliam IL Jr., under appointment by the Supreme 
for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
'l'RAYNOR, J.-Richard G. Riser and his brother Roscoe 
R Riser were charged by indictment with the murder of 
Earl and Pauline Hastings. The jury returned verdicts of 
guilty of murder in the first degree, without fixing the punish-
ment at life imprisonment in the case of Richard G. Riser. 
'l'he court denied his motion for a new trial and sentenced 
him to death. His appeal to this court is automatic under 
section 1239, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code. 
Just before midnight on July 11, 1955, Earl and Pauline 
Hastings, proprietors of the Hilltop Cafe near Oakdale in 
Stanislaus County, were shot and killed during the course of a 
robbery of their cafe. Mr. Basford, a customer, left the cafe 
about 11 :30 p. m. On his way out he passed two men who 
remarked that they were going in to have a beer. He was un-
able to identify either of the men, but thought that they 
had driven up to the Hilltop in a two-tone Chrysler, Buick or 
Pontiac. 
·when these men entered the cafe, the only persons present 
were two customers, Mrs. Burgess andlVIr. Pantel, both seated 
at the bar, and the Hastings. 'l'he men sat on stools at the end 
of the bar away from the other customers and ordered beers. 
After they had ordered a second round of beers, the shorter 
of the two rose from his stool, drew a gun, and announced, 
"This is a stick-up." The other man, who was also armed, 
silently took a position by the front door, while his companion 
went behind the bar where the Hastings were. In an at-
t(•mpt to prevent the robbery, Mr. Hastings seized a bottle and 
attacked the gunman. In the ensuing struggle Hastings was 
struck several times on the forehead and shot. The same 
gunman then shot and killed Mrs. Hastings, apparently as she 
was trying to reach a gun. Then he stepped over Mr. 
Hastings' body, rifled the cash register, and departed with the 
gunman at the door. 
The police arrived shortly after midnight, removed the 
bodies, and searched and photographed the premises. They 
recovered several bullets fired by the gunman, and dusted 
for fingerprints bottles and glasses found on the bar in front 
of the stools used by the two men. 
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Mrs. Burgess identified Richard and Roscoe H.iser as the 
two gunmen and testified that Hichard had done the shooting. 
She admitted that she had been in the bar since 7 :30 p. m. 
and had had five beers, that the bar was quite dark, and 
that she could not see one of the men too well. Mr. Pantel 
testified that he thought Richard was the man who did the 
Rhooting, but was not positive; that he had not seen Roscoe 
before the police lineup at Stockton, and that the man at the 
door appeared to be of Filipino or Mexican extraction. Ex-
pert witnesses testified that fingerprints found on a bottle 
and a glass removed from the bar were the fingerprints of 
Richard Hiser, and that bullets found in a brief case in 
Roscoe's Chrysler were similar in composition to bullets 
found at the scene of the crime. The killing had been done 
vvith a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver. This gun was 
never recovered, but according to expert testimony a holster 
found in Hoscoe 's car had once carried a Smith and \V esson 
.38 Special revolvrr. The brothers' defense was an alibi: 
that they had been in Stockton on the night of July 11th. 
During the voir dire examination of jurors, Hardy M. 
Dunavin stated that he did not believe in capital punishment, 
that nothing would prevent his finding defendant guilty if 
the evidence warranted it, but that in no event would he vote 
for the dc>ath penalty. In response to the court's quc>stion 
whether he entertained conscientious scruples that would pre-
wnt his finding dc>fenclant guilty if the offense charged could 
be punishable with death, he replied, "No." On the basis of 
these answers, and over dc>fendant 's objection, the court 
sustained a challenge by the prosecution under section 107 4, 
subdivision 8, of the Pc>nal Code. 
Section 1074, subdivision 8, provides that: "A challc>nge 
for implied bias may be takE'n for all or any of the following 
causes, and for no other . . . 8. If the offense charged be> 
punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions as would predude his finding the defendant guilty; 
in which case he mnst nrithc>r be permitted nor compelled 
to serve as a juror." Defc>ndant contends that, although 
this provision requires the exclusion of jurors whose deter-
mination of guilt would be affected by their views of eapital 
punishment, neither its language nor its policy rc>quire the 
exrlusion of those whose assessment of punishment alone wonld 
be influenced, and that section 190 in proyiding that a person 
found guilty of murder in the first degree "shall suffer death, 
or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion 
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diYision H. does not eompel the exelusion of jurors incapable 
of exercising the di:-;eretion eontemplateu by section 190. * 
It would be doing violenee to the purpose of these seetions of 
the Penal Code, however, to construe section 1074, subdivision 
8, to permit these jnrors to serve. It vvould in all probability 
work a de faeto abolition of eapital punishment, a result 
whieh, whether or not desirable of itself, it is hardly appro-
priate for this eourt to achieve by construction of an ambigu-
cms statute. 
Defendant contends that the admission in evidence of cer-
tain guns, holsters, belts, and shells was erroneous on the 
ground that they were not relevant to any issue in the ease. 
On the morning of July 23rd, almost two weeks after the 
homicides, police found in Roscoe's Chrysler a brief ease con-
taining three holsters, two leather belts, each with twelve 
rounds of .38 special shells, a box of .22 shells, and fifty-nine 
.38 special shells. 'l'wo more .38 shells were found in the seat 
of the automobile. On the same day police arrested Richard 
and seized a loaded Colt .38 revolver in his possession. Later, 
following directions given them by Roscoe, they discovered 
a P38 automatic with a clip of shells in a cesspool. '1'he court 
overruled objections to testimony describing the finding of 
tlwse objects and also admitted them into evidence. 
[4] Some of the .38 special shells contain bullets that 
were copper-coated factory loads, and others contained hand-
cast lead bullets. There was expert testimony that the fac-
tory loads resembled in weight and shape a factory-load bullet 
found at the scene of the crime, and although the expert could 
not say that they came from the same box as that bullet, he did 
maintain tbat they were of the same type and from the same 
manufaeturer. Defendant brought out that this type of bullet 
is in common use throughout the eountry; nevertheless, the 
similarity testified to by the expert, together with the prosecu-
tion's showing that the .38 shells found in the brief case would 
fit the type of revolver known to have been used in the kill-
ings, justified the trial court's admitting the factory loads. 
[5] '1'he relevaney of the hand-east bullets was even clearer. 
'l'lwre ~was expert testimony, based on spectroscopic analysis 
*The awkwardness of testing the juror by use of the exact language 
of section 1074, subdivision 8, was made abundantly clear in the present 
rase. Time and again the court questioned the juror in the statutory 
language, and time and again the juror replied that he did not entertain 
sueh an opinion ''as would prevent him finding the defendant guilty.'' 
:F'inally, in order to make it ckar to the juror that he was being asked 
if he opposed the death penalty, the court was compelled to abandon 
the statutory language. 
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the metal in the bullets, that those found in the brief case 
were probably from the same batch of lead as the 
hand-cast bullets found at the scene of the crime. The expert 
found ''a remarkable resemblance.'' 
[6] As to the holsters, experts testified that markings in 
's Exhibit No. 26 indicated that it had once carried 
Smith and \Y esson .38 Special revolver. Even if this is a 
gun, we cannot say that possession of the holster was 
not relevant to the issue of the lUsers' possession of the murder 
weapon. 
The prosecution's own witness established that the bullets 
found at the scene of the crime had been fired from a Smith 
~mel IN esson .38 Special revolver, not from either the Colt .38 
or the P38 that the court admitted into evidence. [7] ·when 
the specific type of weapon used to commit a homicide is not 
known, it may be permissible to admit into evidence weapons 
found in the defendant's possession some time after the crime 
that could have been the weapons employed. There need be 
no conclusive demonstration that the weapon in defendant's 
possession was the murder weapon. (People v. Ferdinand, 
194 Cal. 555, 563 [229 P. 341]; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 
113-114 [193 P. 92] .) [8] When the prosecution relies, 
however, on a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit 
evidence that other weapons were found in his possession, for 
such evidence tends to show, not that he committed the crime, 
but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly 
weapons. (People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113, 121 [112 P. 862] ; 
People v. O'Brien, 130 CaL 1, 5 [62 P. 297]; People v. Yee 
Fook Din, 106 Cal. 163, 165-167 [39 P. 530]; People v. Wong 
Ah Leong, 99 Cal. 440 [34 P. 105] .) People v. Beltowski, 
71 Cal.App.2d 18, 23 [162 P.2d 59], cited by the prosecution 
as contrary to this proposition, is adequately distinguished in 
People v. Richardson, 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 541-542 [169 P.2d 
44], on the ground that no specific weapon was relied on in 
the Beltowski case. It was error therefore to admit the Colt, 
two of the holsters, the belts, and the box of .22 shells. The 
P38 was admissible on other grounds that appear below. 
[9] Defendant, however, was not prejudiced by these 
errors. The shells and one holster were clearly admissible, 
and from these the jury would have concluded that defendant 
possessed firearms. The admission of the Colt, more holsters, 
belts, and shells added little to the jury's knowledge gained 
from evidence correctly admitted. The introduction of the 
47 C.2d-19 
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Colt may have actually hrnefited defendant, for it provided 
an explanation for his pos~ession of: the .:i8 shells. An expert 
testified that these shells would fit either a Colt or a Smith 
and vVesson .38 Special, and without the Colt in evidence the 
jury might more easily have concluded that the ammunition 
was kept for a Smith and \Vesson. 
Defendant next cites as prejudicial error the introduction 
of evidence of other crimes. On the stand defendant main-
tained that the only pistols he had ever owned were the Colt, 
the P38, and a toy cap pistol, and he denied having a Smith 
and ·wesson .38 Special. He stated that he had obtained the 
P38 from a sailor in the New Viking Bar, and denied having 
told a police officer that he had taken it from Doc's Village, 
a different bar. Officer Dutil then testified that defendant 
had told him that he had taken the P38 from Doc's Village on 
June 29, 1955. The prosecution followed this with testimony 
by the bartender at Doc's Village that the two brothers had 
robbed Doc's Village on ,Tune 29th, that each had been armed 
with a blue steel gun, and that they had taken away with 
them a P38 kept behind the bar. Finally, the owner of Doc's 
Village identified the P38 found in the cesspool as the one 
that had been kept behind the bar. 
[10] Evidence of other crimes is not admissible when it 
sole effect is to show a criminal disposition, but if it "tends 
logically and by reasonable inference to establish any fact 
material for the prosecution, or overcome any material fact 
sought to be proved by the defense, [it] is admissible al-
though it may connect the accused with an offense not in-
cluded in the charge." (People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504, 
509 [218 P.2d 981] ; see People v. C·itrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 288 
[294 P.2d 32] .) 
The cross-examination of defendant to discover whether 
he had ever owned a Smith and vVesson .38 Special and when 
he had acquired the P38, and the testimony of the witnesses 
from Doc's Village, tended to establish that the Risers entered 
Doc's Village on June 29th armed with two blue steel guns; 
that they there acquired the P38; that therefore they had at 
one time been in possession of three guns, and that only two 
of these were known not to have been Smith and Wesson .38 
Specials. [11] The P38 was admissible to corroborate the 
bartender's testimony that the Risers acquired the P38 at 
a time when they already had two guns. This evidence that 
the Risers had a third gun of unknown make was relevant to 
show that they had the means to commit the crime. (See 
Dec. 1956] PEOPLE v. RISER 
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People v. Simeone, 26 Cal.2d 795, 804-805 [161 P.2d 369] .) 
The trial court closely limited the effect of the testi-
mony on the Doc's Village incident to showing how the 
Risers ·were armed and when they obtained the P38, and 
specifically instructed the jury against drawing broad in-
ferences of criminal tendencies. The court's further limita-
tion of the testimony to purposes of impeachment was, if any-
thing, unduly favorable to defendant. 
Roscoe H.iser also took the stand. On direct examination 
he stated that he had never b0en involved in a robbery; on 
cross-examination the district attorney gave detailed descrip-
tions of numerous robberies committed in San Francisco by 
Roscoe and Richard, intermittently asking Roscoe if he had 
not furnished these descriptions in admitting the robberies 
to the police. Roscoe denied the prior inconsistent statements. 
[12] Defendant complains that the court should have 
immediately instructed the jury that these references to his 
participation in robberies could in no way be used against 
him, since the prosecution did not show that he had been 
present when Roscoe was interrogated. Throughout the trial 
the court, whenever requested to do so, instructed clearly 
and at length that statements made by one defendant were 
not evidence against another defendant who had not been 
present, and it repeated this warning in its general instructions 
at the close of the trial. There is no reason to suppose that 
the jury, even though not reinstructed at this particular 
juncture, did not understand and apply the general principle 
the court had laid down. Furthermore, since defendant did 
not request the court to repeat its warning at this time, he 
cannot now complain. 
[13] Defendant says that it was misconduct for the 
prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that Roscoe had in 
fact made the statements attributed to him; that since the 
prosecutor apparently had neither the intention nor the 
means of establishing the truth of his allegations, he must 
have made them solely to inflame the jury against the brothers. 
( Cf. People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242, 248-249 [246 P.2d 636].) 
We must assume, however, that in view of the court's in-
structions the jury did not consider defendant's alleged par-
ticipation in the robberies. The injury, if any, was to Roscoe, 
and his appeal is not now before us. 
As a further error, defendant eomplains of the admission 
in evidence of a bottle and a glass bearing fingerprints testi-
fied to be the fingerprints of Richard Riser. Deputy Sheriff 
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Lochry identified the bottle and glass as articles that he had 
taken from the Hilltop Cafe. When he arrived at the Cafe, 
early in the morning of July 12th, he found several bottles, 
glasses, and salt cellars on the bar. He dusted them for 
fingerprints, put them in a and locked the box in the 
sheriff's identification truck. About 4 or 5 a. m. he returned 
to the sheriff's office and the artieles in an open book 
case in an office that he shared with another police officer. 
This office >vas unlocked; it was flanked on one side by an 
office shared by two or three persons, and on the other side 
by a hall leading to a general office. According to Loehry, 
the evidence remained in the book case approximately four 
hours, until about 8 :30 a. m., when it was removed and there-
after kept under lock and key or in the eustody of specific 
persons. 
Defendant contends that in view of these facts the prosecu-
tion failed to establish continuous possession, which is a 
necessary foundation for the admission of demonstrative evi-
dence; that since someone eould have altered the prints or 
imposed wholly new ones during the four hours the glass and 
bottle were left unguarded iu the book case, the prosecution 
has not sufficiently identified the prints as those that existed 
when the articles were removed from the bar. Defendant 
would require the prosecution to negative all possibility of 
tampering. 
[14] Undoubtedly the party relying on an expert analysis 
of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the 
evidence found at the scene of the crime, and that between 
receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tamper-
ing (see People v. Coleman, 100 Cal.App.2d 797, 801 [224 
P.2c1 837]; 21 A.L.R.2c1 1216, 1219, 1236-1237), but it has 
never been suggested by the cases, what the praetiealities of 
proof could not tolerate, that this burde11 is an absolute one 
requiring the party to negative all possibility of tampering. 
(See, e.g., People v. Brown. 92 Ca1.App.2d 360, 365 [206 P.2d 
1095]; Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [124 A. 
163].) 
[15] The burden on the party offering the evidence is 
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all 
the eircumstances into account ineluding the ease or diffi-
culty with which the particular eviclenee eonld have been 
altered, it is reasonably certain that there >vas no alteration. 
The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when 
some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted 
581 
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the court must exclude the evidence. (Sec 
Dobson v. Industrial Ace. Com., 114 Cal.App.2d 782, 785 
P.2d McGouxm v. Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d 
389-392 P.2d 862, 21 A.hR.2d 1206] ; People v. 
324, 327-329 [203 P. 816]; Novak v. Dis-
trict of 160 F.2d 588 [82 App.D.C. 95] .) [16] Con-
versely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tam-
it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt 
remains go to its weight. (See People v. Tornasovich, 56 Cal. 
520, 529 [206 P. 119] ; State v. Srnith (Mo.), 222 S.W. 
455, 458-459.) [17] In the present case defendant did not 
point to any indication of actual tampering, did not show how 
fingerprints could have been forged, and did not establish 
that anyone who might have been interested in tampering 
with the prints knew that the bottles and glasses were in 
Deputy Sheriff Lochry's book case. 'l'here was no error in 
the court's ruling. 
[18] In the course of instructing the jury the court stated 
that ''Although there are two degrees of murder, the evidence 
in this ease is such that either both of the defendants, or one 
of them, is innocent of the charge of murder ... or one or both 
of the defendants are guilty of murder in the first degree . 
. . . For murder which is committed in the perpetration or 
attempt to perpetrate ... robbery ... is murder of the 
first degree; whether the killing was intentional, unintentional 
or accidental." (See Pen. Code, § 189.) 
Defendant contends that it was error for the court thus 
to remove from the jury's consideration the degree of murder, 
and whether in fact it had been in the course of a robbery 
or attempted robbery. The evidence, however, was over-
whelming that the homicides had been committed in the 
perpetration of a robbery, and when there is no reasonable 
doubt on this issue the court is justified in withdrawing it 
from the jury. (People v. Sanford, 33 Cal.2d 590, 595 [203 
P.2d 534] ; People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 516 [66 P.2d 
631]; see People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d 371, 381-382 [260 P.2d 1] .) 
Defendant offered no evidence indicating that a robbery had 
not been committed, and in his own statement of facts to this 
court he says that "the killing took place during the com-
mission of a robbery.'' 
[19] In addition to this instruction on felony murder, 
the court gave the jury the code definition of murder, in-
582 PEOPLE i). RISER [47 C.2d 
eluding the provisions on premeditated murder and second 
degree murder, and the code definition of robbery. (Pen. 
Code, §§ 189, 211.) These instructions were unnecessary 
because they covered questions that had already been with-
drawn from the jury by the first instruction. But if any 
confusion was generated by these instructions, it could only 
have benefited defendant by leading the jury to think that 
the question of the degree of murder was still open to its 
determination. {See People v. Peterson, 29 Cal.2d 69, 78-79 
[173 P.2d 11], cert. denied, 331 U.S. 861 [67 S.Ct. 1751, 91 
L.Ed. 1867].) 
In the midst of its deliberations the jury returned to the 
courtroom and the following discussion took place between 
court and jury : 
''THE FoREMAN : The question was, under those circum-
stances would either of the defendants be eligible for parole 
if a recommendation was made for life imprisonment. 
''THE CouRT : I see. Well, the answer of the Court is for 
the purpose of determining the punishment and for that 
purpose, only, it is the law that a person convicted of First 
Degree Murder and sentenced to life imprisonment may be 
eligible for parole. Does that answer your question? 
''THE FoREMAN: Yes. 
"THE CoURT: I might state that it further provides that 
they may be eligible for parole but not before he has served 
seven calendar years. Now, I just state that the law is worded 
that way.'' 
The next day the jury informed the court that it had one 
verdict complete as to one of the brothers. It then submitted 
a written question to the court asking whether ''In the event 
of what is a verdict of guilty on both counts one and two, is 
there any recommendation the Jury can make that would pre-
clude the possibility of parole during the lifetime of a person 
convicted." The court answered, "No." Within an hour the 
jury returned its verdicts of guilty, fixing the punishment at 
life imprisonment for Roscoe, but with no specification of 
punishment for Richard. Under the instructions that were 
given the verdict as to Richard necessarily implied that the 
jury fixed the punishment at death. 
[20] It is now well established that although the jury 
may not weigh the possibility of pardon or parole in deter-
mining the guilt of an accused, it may consider these conse-
quences in exercising its discretion to choose between different 
punishments. (People v. Reese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117 
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[301 P.2d 582] ; People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d 200, 206-208 [266 
P.2d 505], cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 [75 S.Ct. 73, 99 L.Ed. 
668] ; People v. Barclay, 40 Cal.2d 146, 158 [252 P.2d 321] ; 
People v. Osborn, 37 Cal.2d 380, 384-385 [231 P.2d 850] .) 
[21] Defendant contends, however, that it was error for the 
court to give the jury information about eligibility for parole 
before it had determined the question of guilt or innocence. 
'l'his contention is without merit. In both People v. Reese, 
supra, and People v. Byrd, supra, we upheld the trial court 
when it had included in its original instructions to the jury 
the information that one sentenced to life imprisonment could 
be paroled. In those cases, as in the present one, the court 
cautioned the jury against allowing this information to influ-
ence its determination of guilt. Prudence requires no more; 
it does not require that the jury be kept in ignorance of the 
consequences of different penalties until it has finally deter-
mined guilt. Moreover, it is by no means clear in the present 
case that the jury, when it addressed its questions to the court, 
had not already found defendant guilty. 
[22] Defendant also claims that the court misinformed the 
jury when it said that defendant could be paroled in seven 
years if sentenced to life imprisonment; that because of sec-
tions 3024, subdivision (b), and 3048 of the Penal Code, 
defendant could not be paroled in less than ten years. 
Section 3024, subdivision (b), provides that the minimum 
terms of sentence and imprisonment "for a person previously 
convicted of a felony either in this State or elsewhere, and 
armed with a deadly weapon r is) ... 10 years .... " As 
we pointed out in People v. Reese, 4 7 Cal.2d 112, 117-118 
[301 P.2d 582], this provision is in an article of the code 
concerned with the length of sentences and the fixing thereof, 
and not with how much of a sentence must be served before 
a prisoner is eligible for parole. That subject is covered in 
a different article, embracing sections 3040 to 3065. Section 
3049 provides that a person whose minimum term of imprison-
ment is more than one year may be paroled at any time after 
the expiration of one-third of the minimum term. Section 
3046 limits section 3049 by stating that no person imprisoned 
under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at 
least seven calendar years. Authority to grant parole after 
a certain portion of a minimum term has been served is not 
destroyed by a provision sueh as seetion 3024 which sets the 
minimum term itself. 
Seetion 3048, also cited by defendant, limits eligibility for 
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parole when a defendant has been adjudicated an habitual 
criminal. Such an adjudication cannot be made unless the 
prior convictions on which it is to be based have been charged 
in the indictmrnt. (People v. 78 C:aLApp. 503. 
506-507 [248 P. 946] .) No prior convictions were charged in 
the indictment in the present ease, therefore section 3048 has 
no application. 
[23] Defendant's most serious objeetions go to the eye-
witness testimony of Mrs. Burgess m1d. J\Ir. Pantel. One 
eharge is that the prosecution improperly coached Mrs. 
Burgess into identifying defendant as the man she had seen 
at the Hilltop. lVIrs. Burgess identified defendant in a Stock-
ton police lineup. She admitted that after this Lieutenant 
Kilroy had been to her house on numerous occasions, shown 
her pietures and taken her for rides, and that after her appear-
ance before the grand jury the district attorney had discussed 
her testimony with her on several occasions. 'l'here is no evi-
dence, however, that she was prepared in any 'lvay before the 
lineup, and she specifically denied having seen pictures of 
defendant before that time. This evidence is insufficient 
to justify a conclusion that lVIrs. Burgess' identification was 
the result of an idea planted in her mind by the prosecution. 
Before trial defendant moved for an order directing the 
prosecution to furnish him with a copy of the fingerprint 
taken from the bottle, and directing the sheriff's office of 
Stanislaus County to allow him to inspect statements made 
to police by lVIrs. Burgess and lVIr. Pantel immediately after 
the homicides. The motion was denied. 
After cross-examination of witnesses Burgess and Pantel, 
defendant had issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to 
Captain Ross of the sheriff's office commanding him to pro-
duce the originals of the same statements sought by the 
pretrial motion. The afiidavit in support of the subpoena 
asserted that the statements were material and relevant to 
issues in the case and contradictory to the witnesses' present 
testimony. Defendant first learned of the statements from 
local newspapers, which reported Captain Ross as saying that 
the witnesses had described the man who did the shooting as 
tall and slender, with a dark complexion and black hair, and 
the other man as dark complexioned with black hair. Appar-
ently the Riser brothers have blond hair anc11ight complexions, 
and differ significantly in other characteristics from the news-
paper descriptions. On cross-examination Mrs. Burgess ad-
mitted having made a statement to the police. She claimed, 
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, that she described the man who did the shooting 
, not as tall and slender, and although she admitted 
the man by the door as dark complexioned, she 
said that he had black hair. 
v"'''-'u.c1vu moved for an order vacating the subpoena. 
defendant's argument that he was entitled to the 
Ktatements for purposes of impeachment, the motion was 
on the ground that the subpoena sought to bring into 
c:ourt evidence that could not be used for impeachment and 
not otherwise admissible. Defendant contends that this 
was erroneous. 
at common law the accused in a criminal 
action could not compel production of documents or other 
eYidence in the possession of the prosecution. (See 6 \Vig-
more, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 475-476; 8 id. at 219-220.) 
Production was denied before trial on the ground that to 
compel the prosecution to reveal its evidence beforehand would 
enable the defendant to secure perjured testimony and fabri-
cated evidence to meet the state's case. It was felt, further-
more, that to allow the defendant to compel production when 
the prosecution could not in its turn compel production from 
the defendant because of the privilege against self incrimina-
tion would unduly shift to the defendant's side a balance of 
advantages already heavily weighted in his favor. (See gener-
State v. 'T1tne, 13 N.J. 203 [98 A.2d 881] ; State ex rel. 
Robertson v. Steel, 117 Minn. 384 [135 N.W. 1128, Ann.Cas. 
1913D 343] ; 6 \Vigmore, Evidence, snpm, at 475-476.) 
[24] \Yhatever the force of these arguments when directed 
to pretrial discovery, they have little or no application when 
production is sought by subpoena during trial of statements 
referred to on cross-examination. The question then is not 
whether the defendant will be allowed advance disclosure of 
evidence upon which the prosecution plans to base its ease, but 
whether he will be allowed any disclosure of evidence that the 
prosecution does not intend to produce in court at all. (See 
United States v. Kntlewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 [156 A.L.R. 
337].) Furthermore, the additional possibility that the de-
fendant will obtain perjured testimony or fabricated evidence 
as a result of disclosure at this point in the proceedings is too 
slight to justify denying production. [25] The decisions of 
this court have always impliedly recognized that on a proper 
showing a defendant in a criminal case can compel production 
when it becomes clear during the course of trial that the 
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prosecution has in its possession relevant and material evi-
dence. Production has been denied, not on the ground that 
there was never any right to it, but because the requirements 
justifying production had not been met in the particular case. 
(People v. Gallardo, 41 Ca1.2d 57, 67 [257 P.2d 29] ; People 
v. Bennijo, 2 Cal.2d 270, 276 [ 40 P.2d 823] ; People v. Glaze, 
139 Cal. 154 [72 P. 965] .) 
There is authority to the contrary (see, e.g., Little v. Unil'ed 
St.ates, 93 F.2d 401, 407, cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644 [54 S.Ct. 
643, 82 L.Ed. 1105] ; State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397 [91 
N.E. 186] ), but we are convinced that the better reasoned de-
cisions support the position implicit in our cases. (See Gordon 
v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 [73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447] ; 
United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78-79 [156 A.L.R. 
337]; Asgill v. United States, 60 F.2d 776, 778-779; People v. 
Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 149-150 [186 N.E. 422]; People v. 
Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 496-507 [251 N.W. 594].) [26] Ab-
sent some governmental requirement that information be kept 
confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, 
the state has no interest in denying the accused access. to all 
evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in 
particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony 
of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined 
and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits. To 
deny flatly any right of production on the ground that an 
imbalance would be created between the advantages of prose-
cution and defense would be to lose sight of the true purpose 
of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts. (See Gor-
don v. United States, supra, at 419; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, 
supra, at 219-220; cf. People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569 [18 
N.W. 362].) 
In People v. Glaze, supra, we refused to order production 
of a statement that appeared to the court to be inadmissible 
for any purpose, even for impeachment. The witness had 
neither signed the statement nor adopted it in any way. The 
lower courts have consistently enforced this requirement that 
the evidence sought be admissible, without denying, however, 
that production can be had when the evidence can be used to 
impeach and is not confidential. (People v. Wilkins, 135 Cal. 
App.2d 371, 377-378 [287 P.2d 555]; People v. Santora, 51 
Cal.App.2d 707, 712 [125 P.2d 606] ; People v. Singh, 136 
Cal.App. 233, 243 [28 P.2d 416] ; People v. Keyes, 103 Cal. 
App. 624, 638-640 [284 P. 1096]; People v. Haughey, 79 Cal. 
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App. 541, 543-544 [250 P. 406] ; People v. Nields, 70 Cal.App. 
191 [232 P. 985] ; People v. Emmons, 7 Cal.App. 685, 690-
691 [95 P. 1032] .) [27] Nor do we think that the impeach-
ment justifying production is necessarily restricted to impeach-
ment by prior inconsistent statements to the exclusion, for 
example, of impeachment for bias. (See Asgill v. United 
States, supra, 60 F.2d at 779.) 
[28a] In the present case the court denied production on 
the ground that the statements could not be used to impeach 
the witnesses. Vv e are at a loss to understand how the court 
could have reached this conclusion without even seeing the 
statements. Whether they were in writing or signed by the 
witnesses the record does not show, and it is safe to say that 
no one but the prosecution knew. Even if they were not signed, 
defendant might have been able to show, by the testimony of 
a stenographer or other witnesses or by the admissions of 
Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel themselves, that the statements 
had been accurately transcribed and therefore could be used 
for impeachment. (See People v. Bjornsen, 79 Cal.App.2d 
519, 534-535 [180 P.2d 443]; People v. Orosco, 73 Cal. 
App. 580, 593 [239 P. 82] .) 
[29] Obviously a defendant cannot show conclusively that 
a document is admissible without seeing it, and yet in order 
to see it he is told that he must show that it is admissible. 
The proper test for determining whether production must 
be granted is not whether the evidence has been conclusively 
proved admissible but whether, as stated in People v. Glaze, 
supra, at 158, "there is good reason to believe that the docu-
ment when produced would be admissible in evidence for some 
purpose in the case .... '' There must be more than a mere 
possibility that the statements when produced will contain 
contradictory matter and be in such a form that they can be 
used to impeach, but the chance that it may turn out even-
tually that they cannot be used for this purpose should not 
block production at the threshold. 
This precise problem, the relation between admissibility 
and the right to production, was presented in Gordon v. 
United States, supra, and the court there concluded that the 
prosecution had not conceded enough in admitting that it 
would be error to refuse to order production if it would be 
error not to admit the evidence once produced. "[P]roduc-
tion may sometimes be required though inspection may show 
that the document could properly be excluded." ( 344 U.S. 
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at 418.) .As in the case before us, the court was faced with 
a record that showed no reason the statements once pro-
duced could not be used for impeachment. 
[28b] That the statements of Mrs. 
existed and were in the possession of the nY'nQc>r.nhr.n 
police was never denied; that it was 
inconsistent with the witnesses' the 
newspaper accounts. Defendant was unable to JWove con-
clusively that the statE>ments were in a form use 
for impeachment only because the them in 
its exclusive control. The prosecution did not elaim that the 
necessities of law enforcement required that the statements 
be kept confidential, and in view of the fact that the police 
had released the substance of the statements to the press, there 
could be no such claim. Defendant -vvas not for 
generally useful information, but demanded particular docu-
ments reasonably thought to be usable for the specific pur-
pose of impeachment. Finally, defendant went as far as he 
could without benefit of the statements, at least in the case 
of Mrs. Burgess. Once the witness denied the prior incon-
sistencies, there was nothing further defendant could do to 
press the impeachment. It does not appear that there were 
any witnesses to the statements who could recall exactly what 
had been said, and even if there were defendant was not com-
pelled to rely on them if far more impressive documentary 
proof was at hand. vVe conclude that defendant sustained 
the burden imposed on him and that it was error to vacate 
the subpoena. 
[30a] In deeidinR whether this error was prejudicial we 
must determine whether there was a reasonable probability 
that the jury would haYe reached a different wrdict had de-
fendant been allowed to obtain and introduce in evidence 
prior inconsistent statements of the eyewitnessrs. (People 
v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Even if we 
assume that prior inconsistent statements would have im-
paired the value of the eyewitness testimony, there remained 
against defendant the fingerprint evidence, the eYidence that 
he possessed hand-cast bullets that probably had a common 
origin with bullets found at the scene of the crime and a 
holster that had once carried a Smith and \Vesson .38 Special, 
and the evidence that he had had a gun in addition to those 
he admitted owning. 
Weighed against this evidence was the testimony of the 
Risers that they had not been at the Hilltop on .July 11th. 
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had been at the house of Della Fay 
Roscoe's friend, until 7 :30 or 8 o'clock in the 
and then had gone on, Roscoe and Della to a movie 
and Richard on a round of Stockton bars. Richard returned 
home about midnight and did not see Roscoe until the next 
Della ,Jones did not testify. 
Hichard had earlier told police that it was probably on the 
11th that he and Roscoe had gone to Riverbank to buy fur-
returning to Stockton by way of Oakdale where they 
at a bar. At the trial he explained that he had 
been confused about the dates as a result of almost continuous 
by the police for three or four days. Roscoe 
could not recall the Riverbank expedition at all. 
\Vitness Basford testified that the two men he met coming 
into the Hilltop Cafe had been in a Chrysler, Buick or 
Pontiac. Both brothers testified that Roscoe's Chrysler had 
a flat tire on the 11th, and Roscoe said that it had been left 
in the backyard of their mother's house from the lOth until 
the 13th, while they used an old Dodge converted into a 
truck. 'l'heir mother stated that the Chrysler had been in 
the yard from the lOth to the 13th, and that if it had been 
removed it could only have been while she was asleep. A 
witness for the prosecution testified that he had seen the 
brothers getting into the Chrysler on the afternoon or evening 
of the 11th, but on cross-examination his testimony proved 
extremely weak. 
[31] Fingerprint evidence is the strongest evidence of 
identity, and is ordinarily sufficient alone to identify the de-
fendant. (See People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 495 [165 
P.2d 3], affd. 332 U.S. 46 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 
A.hR. 1223] .) [30b] Here there is in addition to the finger-
print evidence the evidence of a common origin for the hand-
cast bullets, a "remarkable resemblance" which we have no 
reason to believe could be the result of chance. The evidence 
that the holster had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38 
Special, and that defendant had possessed an unidentified 
third gun, although not as strong as the fingerprint and bullet 
evidence, contribute to an impressive total of proof identify-
ing defendant. We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is not 
reasonably probable that the jury, faced with this evidence, 
would have chosen to believe instead the unsupported testi-
mony of defendant that he had not been at the Hilltop Cafe 
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on the night of July 11th; accordingly, there has been no mis-
carriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41f2.) 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by a majority 
of this court that while it was error it was not prejudicial 
error for the trial court to deny defendant the right to produce 
documents containing statements by eyewitnesses allegedly 
contrary to those made at the trial by such witnesses. In 
my opinion nothing could be more prejudicial. It is im-
possible for an appellate court to say that the jury was not 
impressed by testimony which absolutely identified the de-
fendant as the perpetrator of the crime given by persons 
present at the time the crime was committed. 
In view of the holding in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 
414 [73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447], it seems incredible that a 
majority of this court could hold that this error was not 
prejudicial. The same problem was there presented. The 
court had this to say: ''By proper cross-examination, defense 
counsel laid a foundation for his demand by showing that 
the documents were in existence, were in possession of the 
Government, were made by the Government's witness under 
examination, were contradictory of his present testimony, and 
that the contradiction was as to relevant, important and 
material matters which directly bore on the main issue being 
tried: the participation of the accused in the crime. The 
demand was for production of these specific documents and 
did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among 
documents possessed by the Government on the chance that 
something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a de-
mand for statements taken from persons or informants not 
offered as witnesses. The Government did not assert any 
privilege for the documents on grounds of national security, 
confidential character, public interest, or otherwise. . . . 
Indeed, we would find it hard to withstand the force of Judge 
Cooley's observation in a similar situation that 'The State 
has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure 
of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused 
parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons.' [People 
v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569 (18 N.W. 362, 363) .] In the light 
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of our reason and experience, the better rule is that upon 
the foundation that was laid the court should have overruled 
the objections which the Government advanced and ordered 
production of the documents. 
''The trial court, of course, had no occasion to rule as to 
their admissibility, and we find it appropriate to consider that 
question only because the Government argues that the trial 
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, might have excluded 
these prior contradictory statements and, since that would 
not have amounted to reversible error, it was not such to 
decline their production. We think this misconceives the issue. 
It is unnecessary to decide whether it would have been re-
versible error for the trial judge to exclude these statements 
once they had been produced and inspected. For production 
purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant, 
competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule; for rarely 
can the trial judge understandingly exercise his discretion 
to exclude a document which he has not seen, and no appellate 
court cmtld rationally say whether the exclttding of evidence 
unknown to the record was error, or, if so, was harmless. The 
question to be answered on an application for an order to 
produce is one of admissibility under traditional canons of 
evidence, and not whether exclusion might be overlooked as 
harmless error. 
"The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that Mar-
shall's admission, on cross-examination, of the implicit contra-
diction between the documents and his testimony removed the 
need for resort to the statements and the admission was all 
the accused were entitled to demand. We cannot agree. We 
think that an admission that a contradiction is contained in 
a writing should not bar admission of the document itself in 
evidence, providing it meets all other requirements of ad-
missibility and no valid claim of privilege is raised against 
it. The elementary wisdom of the best evidence rule rests 
on the fact that the document is a more reliable, complete 
and accurate source of information as to its contents and 
meaning than anyone's description and this is no less true 
as to the extent and circumstances of a contradiction. We 
hold that the accused is entitled to the application of that 
rule, not merely because it will emphasize the contradiction 
to the jury, but because it will best inform them as to the 
document's impeaching weight and significance. Traditional 
rules of admissibility prevent opening the door to documents 
which merely differ on immaterial matters. The alleged 
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contradictions to this witness' testimony relate not to col-
lateral matters but to the very incrimination of '' 
(Emphasis added; pp. 418-421.) It >vas concluded: '"l'he 
Government, in its brief, argues strongly for the widest sort 
of discretion in the trial judge in these matters and urges 
that even if we finn error or irregularity we disregard it as 
harmless and affirm the conviction. \Ve are well aware the 
necessity that appellate courts give the trial wide lati-
tude in control of cross-examination, especially in dealing with 
collateral evidence as to character. Michelson v. United States, 
335 U.S. 469 [69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168]. But this prineiple 
cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from 
the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trmst-
worthiness of crucial testimony. Reversals should not be 
based on trivial, theoretical and harmless rulings. But we 
eannot say that these errors were unlikely to h:we influenced 
the jury's verdict. We believe they prejudiced substantial 
rights and the judgment must be Reversed.'' (Pp. 422-423.) 
The eyewitness testimony was by far the most important 
evidence against this defendant. The murder weapon was 
never found; the similarity in the hand-cast bullets was only 
that they were ''probably of common origin''; and it was 
thought that defendant's holster had once earried a gun of 
a type of the murder weapon. It would appear to me that, 
in Judge Cooley's language, the state should have no interest 
in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of facts; that all 
material and relevant facts should be set forth for the deter-
mination of the jury and, if eertain state witnesses have been 
aceused of making contradictory statements relating to a 
material faet, those statements should also be before the jury 
so that it could determine for itself the trustworthiness of such 
witnesses. The Ameriean eoneept of due process most eer-
tainly encompasses the right of an accused to he confronted 
by trustworthy witnesses ana the right to show, if he can, 
that witnesses against him may not be worthy of belief. Due 
process most eertainly also encompasses the coneept that the 
state will not seek to conceal material evidenee in the aeeused 's 
favor. If due process of law does not cneom]1ass such con-
cepts, then we have most assuredly departed a long way from 
the very foundation upon whieh our system of jnstiee rests-
the ideal that every man is presumed innoeent nntil proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the wonls of l\Ir. Jnstiee 
Holmes (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 [48 S.Ct. 
564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376]), it is better that one 
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criminal escape than that the government play an ignoble part. 
In Mesarosh v. United States (25 L.W. 4001, 4004, 4005) 
the government moved to remand the case to the trial court 
because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals 
by Mazzei, a government witness, although contending that 
the testimony given in the instant case by Mazzei was ''entirely 
truthful and credible." The government sought to have the 
matter remanded to the District Court for a full consideration 
of the credibility of the testimony of the witness Mazzei. The 
counter-motion of petitioners asked for a new trial. In revers-
ing the judgments below with directions to grant the peti-
tioners a new trial, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for 
the court, had this to say: "Mazzei, by his testimony, has 
poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot 
be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity. This is 
a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory juris-
diction over the proceedings of the federal courts. If it has 
any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see that the waters 
of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here, 
the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity. 
'The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of 
the most cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance 
is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with 
supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal 
courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [63 S.Ct. 
608, 87 L.Ed. 819]. Therefore, fastidious regard for the 
honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to 
make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest 
that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be 
assertrd.' Cmnnwm'st Party v. S11bversive Activities Control 
Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124 [76 S.Ct. 663, 100 L.Ed. 1003]. 
"The government of a strong and free nation does not need 
convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot afford to 
abide with them. The interests of justice call for a reversal 
of the judgments below with direction to grant the petitioners 
a new trial.'' 
Surely the great State of California does not need convic-
tions based upon the deprisation of an accused's constitutional 
right to due process of law. 
For the foregoing reasons I would revrrse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was deuiecl ,Jan nary 
30, 1957. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that ihc petition 
should be granted. 
